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Abstract 
 
 
In 1980, Chile dramatically reformed its retirement system, replacing what was an old insolvent 
PAYGO program with a new structure that relies heavily on funded defined contribution 
individual accounts.  In addition, eligibility and benefit requirements were standardized, and a 
safety net for old-age poverty was strengthened. Twenty-five years after this reform, the Chilean 
model is being re-assessed, in terms of coverage, contribution, investment, and retirement benefit 
outcomes. This paper introduces a recently-developed longitudinal survey of individual 
respondents in Chile, the Social Protection Survey (or Encuesta de Previsión Social, EPS), and 
illustrates some uses of this survey for microeconomic analysis of key aspects of the Chilean 
system. 
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The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25: 
Lessons from the Social Protection Survey 
 
 
 
Global aging trends pose bankruptcy threats to many conventional pay-as-you-go 
(PAYGO) social security systems around the world. Accordingly, analysts are looking with keen 
interest at Chile’s funded individual-account defined contribution pension plan, a system that 
was adopted in 1981 and remains in place after 25 years.  Numerous other Latin American 
countries followed Chile in embracing funded individual-account pensions, and the Chilean 
model has received substantial attention in the United States and in other countries as well.1  
Commentators have showered the Chilean pension reform with both praise and criticism, and 
numerous studies have analyzed dimensions of the reform including its impact on the 
macroeconomy, capital markets, and aggregate savings.2  Despite the prominence of the Chilean 
approach to old-age security and continued debate about the pension system’s impacts, however, 
there has been little attention to microeconomic aspects of the new retirement program.  In part, 
this lack of research is attributable to the lack of longitudinal microeconomic data with which to 
conduct such analyses.  
Our goal in this paper is to introduce a recently-developed longitudinal survey of 
individual respondents -- the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Previsión Social or EPS), 
which provides invaluable new information for microeconomic analyses of key aspects of the 
Chilean pension system, and to illustrate some of the analyses possible with these data.  Initiated 
                                                 
1 Other Latin American countries who reformed their pension systems along similar lines include Perú (1993), 
Colombia (1994), Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1996), Bolivia (1997), México (1997), El Salvador (1998), Costa 
Rica (2001),  the Dominican Republic (2003), Nicaragua (2004) and Ecuador (2004). Cogan and Mitchell (2003) 
discuss prospects for funded individual defined contribution account pensions in the United States. 
2 Many have written on Chilean pensions system (c.f. Cheyre, 1988; Iglesias and Acuña, 1991; Baeza and 
Margozzini, 1995 and SAFP, 1998).  Implementati and operational aspects have been explored by Diamond (1994), 
Diamond and Valdés-Prieto (1994), Arenas de Mesa (1997) and Mesa-Lago and Arenas de Mesa (1998). Fiscal 
aspects of the reform are the focus of other work (c.f. Ortúzar, 1988; Marcel and Arenas de Mesa, 1992; Arenas de 
Mesa, 1999). Arenas de Mesa and Marcel (1999) have estimated the financing costs associated with the transition 
(from the old PAYGO to the new funded system) and minimum basic pension guarantees.  Yet a common 
characteristic of these studies (and most studies on the Chilean pension reform) is the use of aggregate and macro-
economic information. In fact, the implications of the pension reform on aspects such as private savings are usually 
deduced from simple aggregate correlations of macro-economic indicators (even though Chile experienced a 
significant number of concurrent economic reforms) or from simulations carried out on general equilibrium models 
(the pioneering application in this respect was Arrau, 1991). Even when specific aspects such as the minimum basic 
pension were analyzed, analysts have simulated representative individuals as they lacked microeconomic data; 
accordingly they did not consider individual heterogeneities critical for questions of equity (c.f. Wagner, 1991; 
Zurita, 1994). 
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in 2002, the EPS fielded a follow-up round in 2004; additional survey waves are scheduled for 
2006 and every two years thereafter (funding permitting).  In addition, the research team has 
worked to link respondent records to a wide range of historical administrative files on 
contribution patterns, benefit payments, and other program features.  Accordingly, the EPS 
represents a substantial advance for analysts interested in important micro questions related to 
the operation of the new Chilean retirement system.  To illustrate some of the richness of the new 
information available, this paper presents new analyses regarding three key policy questions: 
1. Who participates in the Chilean retirement system, and what do lifetime contribution 
patterns look like? 
2. What have people accumulated in the Chilean retirement system, and what benefits 
may be anticipated?  
3. How financially knowledgeable are Chileans about their retirement system? 
These three interlinked questions are of interest as they pertain to the central purpose of a 
retirement system, namely to provide adequate resources for a secure retirement.  The subject of 
pension coverage and who contributes to their pensions over their work lives is important in the 
Latin American context as well in many other nations where pension system non-participation is 
currently a topic of active debate.3  Whether and how individual workers and their families 
participate in the system can only be studied with micro data of the sort we are developing.  
Anticipated retirement benefits from the system are also of key policy interest, as these will vary 
with lifetime contribution patterns as well as socioeconomic status, retirement ages, and other 
factors.  In the Chilean context, it is also worth recognizing that the funded individual-account 
program is backstopped by safety net components, to protect those who accumulate little in their 
personal accounts.  Improved projections of future financing burdens will require detailed data 
on patterns of contributions and assets accumulated over the lifetime. And finally, learning more 
about workers’ financial literacy regarding their pension system is of interest in the Chilean case, 
as lack of knowledge may possibly explain participation and other choices related to the system, 
as well as whether the system favors certain types of people over others (e.g., those with more 
vs. less schooling). 
To preview our results, we show: 
                                                 
3 See for instance Gill et al. (2005). 
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• Over their worklives, men self-report contributing to the pension system about 
half the time since age 18, with lower levels for women. Thus men in their 40’s 
report contributing for a total of about 14 years since age 18, and women about 10 
years.  
• Self-reports of payments into the new Chilean pension system indicate higher 
contribution levels than do administrative records for the same people over the 
same time period. For instance, administrative records for men currently in their 
40’s indicate about 13 years of contribution since age 18, and for women about 6 
years.  
• Spells of non-contribution appear mainly to be periods when people held no jobs, 
were unemployed, or were self-employed (self-employed persons are not required 
to contribute to the system). In other words, contribution patterns during periods 
of work as employees (particularly wage employment) are very high. 
• Account balances reported by respondents who claim to know their AFP 
accumulations are remarkably similar to those derived from administrative 
records, averaging around $3 million Chilean pesos (~US$5,600). Yet only 40% 
of the respondents are able to provide an estimated balance, and administrative 
data for the entire sample suggests that those who offer estimates have larger 
accounts than respondents who cannot estimate their AFP assets. 
• Retirement payments for those currently reaching retirement age also depend on 
Recognition Bonds from the old PAYGO system. Those Recognition Bonds are 
worth as much as the AFP system assets for respondents entitled to them. 
Accordingly, any analysis of retirement assets and eventual benefits must 
recognize both sources of retirement support. 
• Knowledge of the new Chilean pension system is far from perfect. For instance, 
most workers cannot accurately report contribution requirements under the new 
system, how much they pay in commissions, what the rules are for minimum 
pensions, and how they have their funds invested. Lack of knowledge is 
concentrated among those employees with poorer backgrounds, less education, 
and women. 
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• Among retirees, knowledge is more satisfactory. Most people who are retired 
according to administrative records also self-report they are retired (84%).  Some 
two thirds of the retirees know what kind of pension they are receiving, and about 
64% knows the benefit amount (+-20%), though the retired tend to report smaller 
amounts than are indicated by the administrative data.  In general, people who 
know their pension amounts also are those receiving larger benefits than the 
median. 
Some of these findings appear to be matters of concern to the newly elected Chilean president 
who confirms that pension reform is high on her policy agenda. 
 
I.  The Evolution of Chile’s Retirement System4  
Chile pioneered the development of social security in Latin America, establishing its first 
national social insurance fund in 1924.  The subsequent evolution of Chile’s social security 
system had three stages. The first, between 1924 and the 1970s, was based on the Bismarkian 
model of occupationally segmented social insurance schemes. The second, from the 1970s to 
1980, reflected the Beveridge plan’s proposal for universal social security coverage. The 
hallmark of the third, which began in 1980, was the development of a funded system with 
privately managed individual accounts, supplemented with a social safety net to be described 
below. 
A.. The Chilean Retirement System Before 1980 
The Chilean old-age system began in the 1920s, and by the mid-1950s, three main 
pension funds (or “cajas”) provided benefits for most salaried workers and two separate funds 
covered the police and armed forces. As time went on, other funds were created and the menu of 
regimes also expanded within the three main pension programs.  As of the end of the 1970’s, the 
Chilean retirement system included many individual regimes (150) and substantial institutional 
fragmentation (35 different funds; see Castañeda, 1990). Consequently coverage was stratified, 
only moderately progressive, and threatened the nation with a rising fiscal burden. Several 
different governments tried unsuccessfully to reform the structure over the years, but their 
attempts were repeatedly blocked by powerful interest groups (Arellano 1985; Mesa-Lago 1994). 
Benefit eligibility varied across sectors and depended on a minimum number of work years in 
                                                 
4 This section draws heavily on Arenas de Mesa (2005). 
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that sector. Retirement payouts were set according to defined benefit formulas that granted 
higher payouts for more years of work and higher pay in that sector. Many workers were not 
covered at all by any retirement plan, and those who were faced very uncertain benefits due to 
the programs’ increasing insolvencies.   
Issues regarding Coverage:  The core objective of an old-age system is to ensure an adequate 
income for retirees, with most modern systems also providing social insurance for disabled 
persons, surviving spouses, and orphans. Effectiveness in fulfilling these objectives therefore 
relies heavily on the system’s ability to collect contributions or taxes when individuals are in the 
economically active population (EAP). Accordingly, assessing a pension system’s success is at 
least partly measurable by inquiring what percent of active workers pays into the program.  Table 
1 summarizes the fraction of the labor force and the fraction of the employed population that has 
paid into the Chilean retirement system over time, and it shows that the highest ratio of 
contributors was seen mid-1970s with a downward pattern thereafter. When the new system was 
introduced in 1980, the fraction of workers and the overall labor force that contributed to the INP 
system fell precipitously, while the contribution rate to the AFP system rose steadily. Other 
authors report similar patterns over the period, although levels of coverage differ from one study 
to the next (Cheyre 1988; Arellano 1985).     
[Table 1 here]  
The downward trend in effective coverage that began in the early 1970s can be accounted 
for in part by rising unemployment, since jobless workers are not expected to pay into the 
system. But increasing unemployment was not the only reason since coverage within 
occupations (among workers with jobs) also declined in the mid-1970s, falling from 86 percent 
to 71 percent over the period 1975 to 1980 (Cheyre, 1988) or from 71 percent to 53 percent 
(Arellano, 1985). Some writers contend that much of the coverage decline during the 1970s was 
attributable to increased evasion (Cheyre, 1988). Other writers emphasize the complex 
interaction of higher unemployment, greater incentives for evasion, and more precarious labor 
relations (Marcel and Arenas de Mesa 1992). 
Financing the Old PAYGO System:  Another measure of a retirement system’s effectiveness has 
to do with its ability to provide benefits to those eligible to receive benefits.  In Chile, the 
number of retirees and others eligible to receive benefits climbed from approximately 500,000 
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people in the late 1960s to more than 1 million people by the end of the 1970s, for an average 
annual growth rate during that decade of 5.7 percent (Arenas de Mesa 2000).  
Prior to 1980, the system was for all intents and purposes, a PAYGO system (returns on 
the few invested assets amounted to only 2.5 percent of the system’s total annual revenues). As a 
result, the system’s financial equilibrium depended on economic growth, since in a PAYGO 
program, that determines wage levels and hence revenues from contributions (along with trends 
in the ratio of contributing members to noncontributing members).   
Assuming constant conditions in terms of replacement ratios and contribution rates, the 
contribution ratio is in turn determined by demographic factors such as the age composition of 
the population, economic factors such as unemployment, the relative size of the informal sector 
in the economy, evasion rates, regulatory and policy-related factors such as the established 
retirement age, and pension eligibility requirements in such cases as early retirement options. In 
Chile, the ratio of contributing to noncontributing members had trended downward between 
1965 and 1980, falling from 3.6 to 2 contributing members for every pensioner.  At the time of 
the reform, government revenues averaging 2 per cent of GDP per annum had already been 
required to finance the system (see Table 2); further, it seemed clear that maintaining pension 
promises would have required further infusion of large amounts of government revenues to the 
old-age system.   
[Table 2 here] 
B. The 1980 Chilean Pension Reform 
Chile’s pension system, thus, like those of many other Latin American countries that 
undertook reforms later, was institutionally fragmented, included a vast number of different 
regimes, and faced problems regarding finances, coverage, equity, and administrative efficiency 
(Arenas de Mesa 2000). Both the Frei and Allende administrations attempted to standardize the 
pension regimes and to do away with privileges enjoyed by limited groups, but both failed to 
achieve the necessary consensus.  
Several years after the military government of General Pinochet took power, it launched 
national retirement system reform. The first phase sought to stabilize the PAYGO system by 
raising retirement ages, increasing contribution rates, and eliminating some special schemes. 
Subsequently in 1980, the government moved to dramatically reform the system by closing the 
old system to new workers, replacing it with a new system which places at center stage a system 
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of funded defined contribution individual accounts.  In addition, eligibility and benefit 
requirements were standardized.  
While many nonChileans focus primarily on the individual account element of the 
pension system, it must be recognized that the resulting structure is a “three-pillar public/private” 
system, in the terminology of the World Bank (1994). The first pillar has three key components: 
(1) A noncontributory public system provides welfare-based pensions (pensiones 
asistenciales, or PASIS) for the indigent. The system is means tested and is operated 
centrally, for both the determination and payment of PASIS benefits.  
(2) A state-guaranteed minimum pension (MPG) for participants in the Administradoras 
de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs, or pension fund managers) who have 20 years of 
contributions. The purpose of the MPG is to ensure that all eligible participants will 
receive a basic level of minimum old-age income, and it is a key element of Chile’s 
social protection policy. In practice, the federal government makes transfer payments to 
the AFP accounts of retirees who have insufficient balances to pay the minimum pension.  
(3) A public defined benefit system known as the Instituto de Normalización Provisional  
(INP, or National Pension Fund) which administers the old PAYGO defined benefit 
program closed to new entrants by the 1980 reform.5  
The second pillar of the Chilean pension system consists of the mandatory contributory 
defined contribution program known as the AFP system. This is a national savings program 
aimed at all wage and salary workers, intended to provide participants with old-age benefits (it 
also provides life insurance and disability benefits as part of the mandatory program). When the 
new program was announced, existing workers were required to decide whether to remain in the 
old INP system or to move to the new system. Those who moved to the new system received 
credit for INP contributions known as a transferable Recognition Bond (RB).6  The new AFP 
system is mandatory for all new wage and salary workers joining the labor force as of 1981, but 
affiliation remains optional for self-employed workers.  
                                                 
5 This institution also manages the retirement systems of the armed forces (the National Defense Pension Fund or 
Caja de Previsión de la Defensa Nacional -CAPREDENA)  and the police force (Chilean Police Force Pension 
Division or Dirección de Previsión de Carabineros de Chile - DIPRECA). 
6 This is a lump-sum paid by to workers by the government at retirement, based on the last 12 monthly contributions 
before June 1979 and adjusted by the proportion of total years under the public system and an annuity factor.  RBs 
are expected to cost around 1% of GDP per year for the period 2000-2020 (Arenas de Mesa and Marcel, 1999). 
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Wage workers in the AFP system establish individual pension accounts by affiliating 
with one of the privately managed pension funds. By law, workers must contribute 10% of their 
monthly earnings, plus an additional contribution (currently between 2% and 3% of monthly 
wages) to cover administrative costs as well as disability and survivor insurance.7   Workers may 
only participate in one AFP at any given time, but they may periodically switch between AFPs 
by providing proper notice.8  Initially all AFP monies were invested in government bonds, 
though more recently pension fund managers have been permitted to offer a broader (though 
regulated) array of investment choices. They also offer a life-cycle investment strategy that 
automatically moves assets into more conservative investments as workers age.  At retirement, 
retirees may use their accumulated funds (including the RBs) to purchase a lifetime income 
stream.9   
Affiliates having contributed at least 20 years but who have accumulated funds 
insufficient to provide the minimum pension guarantee level are entitled to receive a government 
subsidy financed from general tax revenues.10  Workers cannot receive their pensions until the 
legal retirement age (currently age 60 for women and 65 for men), but early retirement is 
allowed under some conditions.11   Naturally, as with any defined contribution plan, retiree 
benefits depend directly on AFP balances at retirement, and hence benefits are a function of 
workers’ lifetime earnings, contribution histories, and AFP investment choices.  For this reason, 
retirees’ benefits depend more closely on individuals’ risk preferences and behavior, whereas in 
a defined benefit PAYGO plan, solvency risks are more prominent. 
 The third pillar of the Chilean system, like the second, operates on the basis of 
individually funded defined-contribution accounts, but in keeping with the World Bank model 
                                                 
7 Mandatory system contributions are capped at a ceiling earnings level of approximately US$1,500/ month; fewer 
than 5% of AFP contributors earn over that ceiling.  
8 In response to high levels of churning across AFPs, the Superintendency of the AFP system in 1997 required 
participants to file paperwork in person at their AFP, a move that greatly diminished the rate of fund switching. 
9 Additional factors influencing pension amounts are the worker’s life expectancy (derived from age and sex-
specific official life tables) and the worker’s number of survivors at the time of retirement. Retirees have three 
withdrawal options: (i) Programmed Retirement (Retiro Programado), which allows a system of phased 
withdrawals from the accumulated funds, and where the pension amount is recalculated every year; in this case the 
pension is paid by the AFP; (ii) a real lifetime annuity from an insurance company (Renta Vitalicia); in this case the 
AFP will transfer funds to the insurer which in turn makes monthly payments; and (iii) some mix of phased 
withdrawals for a determined period and a deferred lifetime annuity. 
10 The current minimum monthly pension is US$105 while the minimum wage is about US$150 a month. 
11 Early retirement may be permitted if the worker can demonstrate that his early retirement benefit would be at least 
110% of the minimum pension benefit level and 50% of his average monthly contributions over the last 10 years 
(currently 60% of pension benefits paid by AFPs are for early retirement). 
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that gained in popularity during the 1990s, it is a voluntary program. Affiliates who wish to pay 
more than the mandated pension contribution may do so, and such contributions receive some 
tax benefits. 
The new AFP system and the old PAYGO system differ in key ways. Most importantly, 
workers’ AFP accumulations represent funded individually-owned accounts, over which 
affiliates have some investment and bequest decision-making power. The old system, by 
contrast, faced bankruptcy due to its PAYGO structure. In moving to the new plan, the hope was 
that workers would become more aware of the value of participating in the system, the size of 
their own accumulations, the opportunity to make investment choices, and the options regarding 
retirement payouts. Further, under the AFPs, workers have a chance to save more than the 10% 
required contribution, which might be attractive to those who truly value access to funded 
individual investment-based accounts. Also, AFP savings and pension payouts are inflation-
adjusted, addressing a well-known deficiency of the old PAYGO plan.12  And finally, the fact 
that AFP affiliates are guaranteed a minimum wage-indexed retirement benefit – worth twice the 
welfare benefit – if they pay into the new system for 20 years was anticipated to draw more 
workers into formal sector jobs.  
C. Transition Issues 
Twenty-five years of experience with the new reform finds the Chilean transition process 
in full swing. Both the old and the new systems continue in operation, with the old one being 
gradually wound down over time, and the new one growing at a steady pace. Contributors to the 
old Chilean system will cease being active workers in about 2025, and retirement pensions will 
stop being paid in approximately 2050.13  
It is interesting that the reform was intended to confine the government’s role to that of 
pension system regulator, inspector, supervisor, and guarantor of the AFP system. In particular, 
via the Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (SAFP, or 
Superintendency of Pension Fund Managers), the government is charged with regulating, 
                                                 
12 All pension system variables (pension funds, yields, benefits) are measured in "unidades de fomento" (UF), an 
accounting unit indexed to inflation. Thus, pensions are automatically inflation-adjusted, therefore, solving a long-
standing and serious problem of Chilean social insurance. Unlike regular pensions, however, the minimum pension 
is not indexed against inflation but is instead periodically adjusted by the government.. 
13 The AFP system currently covers nearly half as many pensioners as the INP system, has more beneficiaries than 
the welfare PASIS pension, and includes three times as many beneficiaries as the public pension system for the 
armed forces (Arenas de Mesa 2004). 
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inspecting, and supervising the management of the AFP system (SAFP 2002.)  In addition, the 
government plays a significant role in several key areas:  
(i) Administration and payment of benefits under the old INP system; 
(ii) Administration, calculation, and payment of “recognition bonds”, for those who 
transferred to the AFPs;  
(iii)Administration and payment of pension benefits under the public plans for the armed 
forces and the police;  
(iv) Administration and payment of the minimum pension guarantee under the AFP system; 
and 
(v) Administration of the PASIS welfare benefit system for indigents and those lacking 
pension coverage.  
 
The first two of these governmental duties is time-limited, but the others are ongoing.  
Furthermore the government also serves as the guarantor of last resort in the event of the 
bankruptcy or default of any AFP or insurance provider, and also by ensuring that the yields for 
plan members remain above an established floor rate. Each of these responsibilities imposes an 
actual and potential financial burden on government coffers, the amount of which is an area of 
continuing research (Arenas de Mesa and Gumucio 2000).  
Economic Impacts of the Funded Individual Accounts:  The accumulating pension funds have 
played a growing role in the Chilean economy since 1980. The assets have grown to around 60 
per cent of GDP (see Table 3; as of 2003). The pension funds have acted as an engine of growth 
for various sectors of the economy and for the capital and life-insurance markets, among others. 
The AFPs are now the largest institutional investors in the financial market. They finance five 
out of nine new mortgages (SAFP 2002).  
 [Table 3 here] 
The asset mix of these funds has changed considerably and has tended to become more 
diversified (see Table 4). In 1981, the bulk of these investments were in financial paper (71.3 
percent), but in 1989 the share of such instruments began to shrink, falling to 26 percent by 2003. 
Meanwhile, the share of corporate bonds (bonds issued by nonfinancial institutions) and equities 
expanded, rising to 7.7 percent and 14.5 percent (13.5 percent in business enterprises and 1 
percent in financial institutions), respectively, by 2003 (about 13 percent of GDP). Investment in 
foreign assets began in 1993 (although the law making this an option was passed in 1990). In that 
year, such investments amounted to 0.6 percent of the funds’ total value; by 2003, their share had 
grown to 23.8 percent. These changes in AFP portfolios have been made possible by the pension 
 11
funds’ growth, the development of the capital market and the relaxing of regulations that place 
limits on investments (SAFP 2002).  
[Table 4 here] 
 
 
II. The Social Protection Survey and Linked Administrative Data 
In 2002, the Micro-data Center of the Department of Economics of the Universidad de 
Chile under the Directorship of David Bravo conducted a new household survey (2002 EPS, 
Encuesta de Previsión Social, or Social Protection Survey). This is an invaluable research tool 
providing researchers a host of useful new individual-level information for addressing numerous 
research questions including the main issues of this chapter – information that previously was 
unavailable.14 The interview sample was drawn from a sampling frame of approximately 8.1 
million current and former affiliates of the Chilean old-age systems compiled from official 
databases obtained from the Chilean Ministry of Labor and Social Security; the frame included 
about three-quarters of the population age 15+ in 2001.  The survey was fielded between April 
and December of 2002, collecting data from individuals who were working, unemployed, out of 
the labor force, receiving pensions, or deceased (in the latter case, information was collected 
from surviving relatives).   
The 2002 EPS survey included socio-demographic information and current labor market 
data for each member of the household, detailed information about receipt of pensions and types 
of pension plan participation and retrospective labor market history going back to 1980.  
Ultimately, the 2002 survey contains data on 17,246 individuals (937 of them were reports by 
surviving relatives) affiliated with the old or the new retirement system for at least one month at 
any time during the 1981-2001 time span.15   
  Another round of the survey was administered in 2004, which included a second wave for 
                                                 
14 The 2002 survey was initially called the 2002 History of Labor and Social Security (HLSS, Historia Laboral y 
Seguridad Social) survey.  But the follow-up 2004 and 2006 longitudinal surveys are called Social Protection 
Surveys (SPS, Encuesta de Previsión Social).  To avoid awkward terminology therefore we refer in this chapter to 
the 2002 data, as well as the subsequent rounds of data, as Social Protection Surveys. The interested reader is 
referred to http://www.proteccionsocial.cl/english/presentacion2002.htm for access to the public use data, 
codebooks, and documentation of the survey.  
15 Information on the methodology and extent of the survey can be found in Bravo (2004). Members of the Armed 
Forces or police covered by separate government pension systems were excluded, as well as a very small percentage 
of the Chilean population residing in inaccessible or sparsely populated areas (e.g. islands).  
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previously surveyed respondents, plus new surveys for a subsample of individuals not affiliated 
with the social security system (individuals never employed in the formal sector) and also a 
subsample of new entrants into the AFP system between 2002 and 2004. In addition a host of 
new health and wealth questions were introduced for the first time.16  Accordingly, the 2004 
survey is representative of the entire Chilean population.17  Furthermore in 2004, the research 
project received permission to merge responses to the sampled respondents with administrative 
records on pension contributions and earnings in the PAYGO and AFP systems since 1980, data 
on the amounts of recognition bonds; and monthly data on account changes in the individual 
investment accounts, switches between AFPs, AFP commissions charged, and investment returns 
earned on all accounts in the AFP system. The survey data has also been merged with monthly 
Social Security records, available since 1981.18  In what follows, we provide details about the 
specific variables central for each analysis. 
 
III.  Informing the Policy Debate Using the Social Protection Survey 
As noted above, the 2002 and 2004 Social Protection Surveys linked to administrative 
records provide the essential data base for answering the critical micro questions about the 
current Chilean pension system posed in the introduction of this chapter. Next we turn to the 
evidence.    
A. Contribution Patterns under the Chilean Retirement System  
In this section, we characterize retirement system contributions made by EPS 
respondents. The information used to track contributions is derived from two sources.  First, EPS 
interviewees were asked about their employment and old-age system work histories and 
contribution patterns from 1980 on. Specifically, Module II of the 2002 EPS survey asks, for 
each job held since age 15, whether the respondent contributed to the some retirement system, 
and if so, which system. In addition it asks respondents to report earnings, hours of work, labor 
force status, occupation and industry for each job. We use this survey information to derive the 
so-called respondent self-reported months of contribution over time. These may be further 
classified according to the workers’ labor market status at the time, which we identify as either 
                                                 
16 A number of the questions were adapted from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) with the intention of 
providing cross-national comparisons. 
17 Weights are available to reweight to random sampling proportions. 
18 An additional round of the survey is being administered in 2006 and there are plans to undertake further rounds in 
2008 and 2010.   
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working, unemployed, or not in the labor force. To derive the self-report months of contributions 
to various retirement systems, we first turn to the labor history section of the 2002 EPS. Here we 
only count months of contributions reported for respondents between the ages of 18 and 60, 
inasmuch as there is little formal work prior to the younger age, and some groups, particularly 
women, retire at age 60.    
The results of this tabulation may be seen in Table 5. Panel A contains both self-reports 
and administrative records on months of contributions to the AFP system, for those for whom we 
have both sets of records.19 Panel B indicates total months of contributions to all retirement 
systems, including the old INP as well as the AFP programs.  Turning first to the self reports on 
AFP contributions, we find that men report more months of AFP contributions, on average, than 
do women. This is not surprising, given that many Chilean women leave the paid labor force for 
childrearing.  Also clear is the rising pattern of contributions by age, such that workers in their 
late 20s report 64 months of contributions to the AFP system (5.3 years on average) since 
1/1981, while workers in their 50’s report more than double this level (14.1 years). It is worth 
recalling that workers older than 39 in 2002 would have been exposed to the old INP system 
prior to the 1980 reform, and hence they are likely to have had periods of contributions under the 
old system as well (more on this below). 20   Somewhat surprising is the result that months of 
contributions do not vary much by education, at least for the self-reported tallies. 
[Table 5 here] 
The second column in Panel A, Table 5, indicates mean months of contributions to the 
AFP system derived from administrative records over the same calendar period, while the third 
column displays the ratio of self-reported months to administrative data.21  Overall, self-reported  
contribution months exceed the administrative data counts by 20%, no doubt in part due to recall 
error.22 Those in the 30-50 age range seem to be most optimistic regarding their self-reported 
months of contribution, with lesser differences for younger and older individuals. The third 
                                                 
19 The sample size for which we can currently link self-reports and administrative AFP records for the EPS 2002 is 
11,305.  
20 The reader should be reminded that as the AFP system has been in place only since the early 1980s and our 
tabulations run to mid-2002, the maximum possible number of months in the chart can total only about 260.   
21 Data on AFP contributions are available only from 1/1981. INP contribution patterns may become available in the 
future but to date these are unavailable for analysis. 
22 Another reason that the self-reports of contribution months are higher is that the EPS labor history asks for job 
beginning and end dates; our calculation assumes that contributions were made without interruption on each job, 
which may produce an overstatement of contributions if layoffs or other interruptions occurred but are not accounted 
for in the reported beginning and end dates. 
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column shows that men are less likely to over-report than women, compared to administrative 
records; younger workers less than middle aged workers; and educated workers less than the 
low-educated. Figure 1 plots the months of contribution patterns and differences by more 
detailed age groups, for the AFP system alone, and for (self reports) of contributions to all 
retirement systems. Overall the patterns appear similar to those depicted in Table 5. 
[Figure 1 here] 
  For purposes of comparison, Panel B of Table 5 provides self-reported months of 
contribution data for all retirement systems including the old INP, various public sector “cajas”, 
and the new AFP system. The first two columns focus on respondents with linked records only, 
while the third column focuses on all EPS 2002 respondents (whether or not they had linked 
records). Not surprisingly, overall patterns are similar to those previously described by age, sex, 
and education. One difference is that self-reported months of contributions to all systems are 
higher than those to the AFP system alone, mainly due to the fact that older (age 40+) workers 
report more contribution months. This is probably accurate, inasmuch as the older workers could 
have been contributors to the old INP system (and we lack accurate contribution history data 
from that system).  
  Table 6 breaks down the pattern of workers months of contributions in the retirement 
system by labor market categories, specifically working, unemployed, and not in the labor force. 
The data reveal that the majority of contribution months coincide precisely with those months 
when respondents were working (particularly in the wage labor force). And contribution patterns 
during period of work (particularly wage employment) are very high.  Put differently, lapses in 
contributions appear mainly associated with periods of nonemployment, rather than outright 
nonpayment of retirement contributions during employed periods.  This suggests that analysts 
concerned with low levels of retirement accumulations would do well to focus on non- or un-
employment. Furthermore, contribution months are very high for periods of wage work, in the 
80-90 percentile range. This implies that the problems of low contribution months are not 
concentrated among the self-employed; though self-employed persons are not required to 
contribute to the system this does not seem to be a major source of nonpayment.   
[Table 6 here] 
 
B. Retirement Accumulations in the Chilean Retirement System  
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  Previous research has focused on whether workers are contributing ‘enough’ to the 
Chilean retirement system to obtain adequate benefit levels in retirement. Thus analysts have 
calculated projected replacement ratios for AFP participants on the assumption that workers 
would contribute 70-90 percent of their worklives (c.f. Arenas de Mesa and Gana 2003). The 
replacement rate is defined here as the percentage of the worker’s last pay divided by his 
monthly pension (assuming the partnered retiree takes a joint and survivor benefit). But in a 
more recent study, Arenas de Mesa, Llanés, and Miranda (2004) re-computed projected 
replacement ratios using the self-reports of contribution patterns taken from the 2002 EPS.  
These new findings are important as they rely on actual patterns of contributions reported over 
workers’ lifetimes, rather than assumed contribution patterns on average. In addition they 
provide evidence at the individual worker level so one can project patterns by earnings, sex, and 
age.  These studies project likely AFP balances at retirement, and replacement rates implied by 
these projections for a male age-65 retiree with female partner 5 years younger, and a lifetime 
contribution pattern of 80% of the worklife (aka “density of contributions”) of 60%; and a 
female age-60 retiree with a density of contributions of 80% or 43%.23 At 65, the man having 
contributed 80% of his worklife would be expected to accumulate an AFP balance of $37 
million, which those authors expect would finance a (joint and survivor) annuity amounting to 
about 60% of pre-retirement pay. A single woman who retires earlier after the same contribution 
pattern would accumulate an AFP balance of $29 million implying a replacement ratio of 43%. 
But having lower lifetime contributions reduces projections substantially: for instance, if men 
contributed only 60% of the time and women 43%, estimated AFP balances would be projected 
to be lower by 25 to 46%, and the pension annuity drops from to 60% to 44% for men, and from 
43% to 23% for women (see Figures 2 and 3).    
[Figures 2 and 3 here] 
In the present paper, we do not develop new projections of accumulations and 
replacement rates using the administrative data, though this will be undertaken in future work.  
But we inform that analysis by reporting on retirement system assets accumulated by participants 
to date.  Panel A of Table 7, for instance, shows that AFP account balances reported by 
respondents who state that they know their accumulations are quite accurately measured 
                                                 
23 That analysis assumes that workers’ initial taxable earnings were  CP$200,000 (somewhat below twice the current 
minimum wage); that real earnings would grows at 2% per year to 50 years of age; that pension investments would 
earn 4% real per year; and that the worker would pay fixed monthly commissions of $500. 
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compared to AFP balances from administrative records, with the median at around $3 million 
Chilean pesos (~US$5,600). On the other hand, only 40% of the EPS respondents could provide 
an estimated AFP balance, and one might anticipate that these individuals would likely have 
more assets than those unable to provide an estimate. Indeed, over the entire EPS sample, the 
median respondent offering a balance estimate appears to have four times the accumulation 
compared to the median respondent unable to estimate his AFP assets, according to 
administrative records. Across the entire sample, the median AFP accumulation derived from 
administrative records totals about $1.5 million Chilean pesos (or about US$2,800). 
[Table 7 here] 
Retirement payments for those currently reaching retirement age also depend on 
Recognition Bonds from the old PAYGO system. Panel B of Table 7 shows that these 
Recognition Bonds are worth as much as the AFP system assets for respondents entitled to them, 
with the median account worth about $4 million Chilean pesos (~US$8,000). Accordingly, it is 
clear that analyses of projected retirement benefits under the Chilean retirement system must 
recognize both sources of retirement support. Panel C indicates that AFP accruals for those 
without a Recognition Bond are lower, in part because this group is much younger than those 
who accumulated substantial benefits under the system that was closed to new entrants in 1980. 
C. Financial Literacy Regarding the Chilean Pension System  
  What workers know about their old-age benefit system can have a major impact on how 
effectively they prepare for retirement, and how they determine their retirement plans. For 
example, if people believe their benefits rise with deferred retirement, they may be more likely to 
respond to incentives to continue work. On the other hand, if they systematically misperceive the 
costs and benefits of the system, their misinformation can shape the system’s popularity as well 
as the perceived effectiveness of specific reforms (e.g. number of years required for eligibility). 
Yet very little is known about how people develop the necessary level of financial literacy to 
understand their pension systems, particularly when workers have personal defined contribution 
pension accounts.  Studies based on the United States’ experience suggest that many workers 
arrive at retirement with little knowledge of their retirement system.24  As a result, they often fail 
to plan well for their retirement and may be ineffective advocates for retirement system changes.  
Little is known about whether similar problems arise for workers in a national defined 
                                                 
24 See for instance Mitchell (1988), Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2006). 
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contribution system. As they bear greater responsibility for their own retirement and pension 
options through personal accounts, workers may be better informed about retirement risks and 
rewards.  
  In this section, we investigate to what extent Chilean workers understand and make sense 
of the pension institutions covering the workforce. We posit that those better informed about 
their pensions are more likely to make sensible provision for old age, possibly by contributing 
more, paying more attention to plan investments, and making appropriate payout options. 
Accordingly, we investigate the factors associated with being informed about the pension 
system’s characteristics, focusing on, for example, the association with age, schooling, 
occupation, sex, one’s birth cohort, and socioeconomic class.  Answers to these questions are 
important for understanding how people perceive their pension system and whether they value 
the future benefits it will provide. This was an important issue in the recent national elections in 
Chile, and is a key source of discussion throughout all the Latin American nations which have 
moved toward systems similar to Chile’s (Gill et al. 2004). Our results help identify which 
workers can most efficiently understand and maneuver under such plans, how the plans might be 
made more effective, and what are the distributional implications of such plans.  
Our results on knowledge of key aspects of the Chilean pension system are summarized 
in Table 8. Across the top of the chart we indicate the data source, sample, and number of 
included observations in each cell. Columns (a) and (c) refer, respectively, to the responses for 
the 2002 survey, first for the entire 2002 sample, and second for just those who were 
reinterviewed in the panel in 2004. Column (e) refers to all EPS interviewees in 2004, while 
Columns (g), (i), and (k) breaks the total down into the panel subset, new entrants (affiliates) to 
the pension system, and non-affiliates.  
[Table 8 here] 
Row A in Table 8 reports respondents answers to whether they received a statement from 
the AFP system (the quarterly “cartola” which reports past contributions and projects future 
benefit amounts). It must be noted that the questions differed slightly across the two years:  2002 
respondents were asked whether they had received their AFP quarterly report, whereas 2004 
respondents were asked whether they had received an AFP cartola in the past 12 months. In any 
case, the results are comparable: in the earlier year, 60% of respondents said they received the 
statement, whereas in 2004 the fraction stood at 69%, with a similar change for the subset of 
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panel members. Three-quarters of new affiliates, who are likely to be younger than the average 
respondent, affirm they received it.  
Whether the effort to provide pension information translates into useful knowledge about 
the pension system is quite another matter. Row B.1 of Table 8 shows whether respondents knew 
the contribution (or payroll tax) rates required for AFP accounts; Row B.2 then indicates whether 
the responses are correct.  In 2002, slightly more than half (53%) of the respondents claimed that 
they knew what the payroll tax rate is, but just over one-quarter (28%) got the answer correct. In 
2004, fewer of the panel members (46%) claimed to know the rate, though more of them (34%) 
now got the tax rate correct. Not surprisingly, new affiliates are less well-informed, and non 
affiliates know little to nothing about required contributions. 
Another topic of recent policy interest has to do with the commissions charged by the 
AFPs. If AFP participants pay little attention to investment costs, it is likely that AFPs will not 
need to compete amongst themselves to drive down prices and enhance service (Berenstein and 
Ruiz, nd; Valdes Prieto, 2005). The results from our analysis show, in Row C, that fewer than 
2% of the respondents (including panel members as well as new affiliates), know either the fixed 
or variable commissions in either year. Only half of one percent of all respondents claim to know 
both the fixed and variable commissions. The fact that workers and savers know virtually 
nothing about the costs of investing their funds suggests that there is much work to be done to 
educate Chileans about this key aspect of their retirement system.  
  Financial information regarding amounts accumulated in workers’ retirement accounts, 
and how the funds are invested, is reported in Rows D and E of the same Table.  Line D.1 
indicates that 45% claim they know their AFP balances in the 2002 survey, with the fraction thus 
knowledgeable rising to over 50% two years later. Among panel members interviewed both 
waves, 20% of the respondents had more information in the second period than in the first.  It is 
also of interest that new affiliates also are relatively well informed, with 42% saying they knew 
their balances. Line D.2 indicates how accurately respondents in 2004 reported AFP their 
balances, compared to administrative records. Estimated balances are within 20% of 
administrative amounts for 21% of the sample. Overall, it would appear that AFP plan 
participants in Chile are about as well (or poorly) informed as compared to their US counterparts 
in corporate pensions. For instance, Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) find that US workers tend to 
understate their defined contribution assets by about 30%, at the median, as compared to 
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administrative records, and by half in the middle and upper tails.  Furthermore, the low fraction 
of those who can offer accumulation estimates suggests that many workers are not well apprised 
of a key retirement asset.  
  For the first two decades of life of the Chilean AFP system, affiliates could only decide 
which AFP they wanted to invest with, but they were not permitted to diversity their holdings 
across AFPs, nor were they permitted to make asset allocations. In 2000, the government 
permitted the AFPs to open a more conservative account for retirees or near-retirees (with 10 
years of the legal retirement age; and then in 2002, each fund administrator was permitted to 
expand the number of investment offerings from two to five in order to allow participants to 
diversify their asset allocations. Under this new “multifund” structure, each AFP must offer a so-
called Fund A which invests 80% of the portfolio in equities, Fund E which holds 100% fixed 
income; and Funds B-D which hold intermediate fractions of equities.  Workers may elect to 
hold up to two funds in a single AFP at a time.  
  What Chileans indicate that they know about their pension investments is summarized 
Section E of Table 8. Line 1 finds that respondents in 2002 did not know much about their 
pension investments (10% claimed to know), but this is not surprising given that they had not yet 
been granted access to a variety of fund choices. By 2004, almost half of the respondents claim 
that they know about the multifund setup, though only one-third would admit to knowing how 
many funds there are, and only around one-fifth can give the correct total number of funds. 
Further, in 2004, only one-third of the respondents said they knew which funds they held, but 
only 16% was accurate and 38% was aware of which fund is the riskiest.  
  Turning finally to retirement system payouts, Section F of Table 8 breaks the results into 
three topic areas. First, we summarize what people know regarding the AFP system payouts. 
Second, we review what they know about the minimum pension guarantee payable to those who 
have made 20 years of contributions. And last, we outline what people know about the minimum 
welfare (PASIS) benefits.  
  Several key questions arise regarding the rules pertaining to eligibility and access to 
benefits under the Chilean retirement system. For instance, the legal minimum retirement 
age refers to the age at which eligible retirees may claim benefits. When asked what the legal age 
is for women and men, knowledge here seems quite widespread – around 83-86% report these 
ages accurately in 2002 (Lines F1.1-1.2). The percentages fall a bit by 2004, mainly due to the 
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inclusion of non-affiliates in the overall sample, though panel members also show a decline in 
knowledge.  Line 1.3 shows that very few people feel they know how AFP benefits are 
calculated, with 14% of the panel in 2002 falling to 11% two years later. Almost two-thirds of 
respondents claim to know the rules for spouse and dependent benefits, but again the percentages 
fall between years for the same panel sample. It must be acknowledged that many are simply 
unaware of the social insurance coverage that their spouses and children receive when the worker 
contributes to the AFP system. 
   Also of interest is the question of whether respondents know about requirements for the 
minimum pension guarantee as well as the benefit level. Some pundits have suggested that 
requiring 20 years of contributions for eligibility might induce workers to drop out of formal 
sector jobs, and recently some analysts have opined that that the minimum benefit might need to 
be raised (Rother 2006). Our EPS research shows (lines F2) that few respondents in 2002 knew 
the requirements for the minimum pension benefit, and only a very tiny minority can accurately 
report the requirements for the minimum pension guarantee (0.2% or fewer). Regarding financial 
literacy, there was an increase in the panel’s awareness of the minimum pension between 2002 
and 2004, rising from 22 to 34% , but the accuracy of their knowledge declined.    
The final section of Table 8 focuses on what respondents know regarding the welfare 
(PASIS) benefit, which is a means-tested payment to the indigent.  It is interesting that about 
20% of the respondents in both years claim they know the eligibility requirements, with no 
important difference between affiliates and nonaffiliates in 2004 (new affiliates know the least). 
Further, only 3-4% of the respondents actually know what the correct eligibility requirements are 
for these payments.  Similarly, a relatively large percent (~17%) claims to know the value of the 
welfare payment, but only about 11% actually knows. While those most likely to need the PASIS 
benefit, namely the nonaffiliates, are no more likely to be aware of this safety net than others, 
they are better informed about the welfare benefit level than their affiliated counterparts. This 
may suggest that those most likely to need this program are somewhat more cognizant of it.  
Among retirees, knowledge is generally more accurate than among workers. Most people 
who are retired according to administrative records also self-report they are retired (84%).  Some 
two-thirds of the retirees know what kind of pension they are receiving, and about 64% know the 
benefit amount (+-20%), though the retired tend to report smaller amounts than are indicated by 
the administrative data.  Using the EPS, we can compare respondent questions about payouts 
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with the administrative records.  Comparing those having both self-reports and administrative 
data linkage, and focusing first on those who say they took the programmed withdrawal payout 
option, Panel A indicates that beneficiaries understate the value of their payouts by about 7%. 
That is, at the median, retirees self-reported benefits of only $69,000 pesos, compared to $74,000 
from the administrative records. For those receiving life annuities, the degree of understatement 
was even more substantial, with retirees reporting benefits about 10% lower than actually paid. 
The degree of overstatement was less at the low end. Panel B shows that retires who said they 
knew what type of income they received generally had lower actual benefits than the 
uninformed.  Official data in Panel C show that, as of December 2005, the Chilean pension 
system had some 377,000 old-age retirees, of whom almost 70% were receiving benefits in the 
form of a life annuity.25   
 
IV. Implications and Conclusions 
It is fitting that the Chilean pension reform is receiving much attention as it celebrates its 
Silver Anniversary. But despite this attention and continued debate about the system’s impacts, 
there has been little attention to microeconomic aspects of the new retirement program.  We have 
introduced a recently-developed longitudinal survey of about 20,000 individual respondents that 
we have undertaken, the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Previsión Social or EPS), 
initiated in 2002 with subsequent biennial survey waves.  This data set provides valuable new 
information for microeconomic analyses of key aspects of the Chilean pension system, that is 
strengthened further by the links that we have made between respondent records and a wide 
range of historical administrative files on contribution patterns, benefit payments, and other 
program features.  Accordingly, the EPS represents a substantial advance for analysts interested 
in important micro questions related to the operation of the new Chilean retirement system.   
To illustrate some of the richness of the new information available, this paper presents 
new analyses regarding three key policy questions: 
1. Who participates in the Chilean retirement system, and what do lifetime contribution patterns 
look like?  We find that on average, men report almost 40% higher months of AFP contributions 
than women, which is not surprising given that many women interrupt their labor force careers to 
rear children.  Men report about a fifth and women report about a quarter higher months of 
                                                 
25 Ths confirms recent findings by James et al. (2006) on payouts under the Chilean pension system. 
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contributions than indicated in the administrative records, which suggests that self-reports 
underestimate the extent of shortfall in coverage for sufficient months to satisfy the 20 year 
minimum contribution requirement for the state-guaranteed minimum pension (MPG) for 
participants in the AFPs, somewhat more so for women. The probable extent of dependence on 
the PASIS, thus, is greater than would be indicated by self reports.  Also not surprising, there is a 
positive relation between reported months of AFP contributions and age, with on average an 
increase in reported months of contribution of a third of a month for every additional month of 
age over the prime working years between 26-30 and 51-55 years of age.   Somewhat 
surprisingly, self-reports do not differ with schooling attainment; in contrast, the administrative 
records indicate a positive association with schooling attainment, at least for those who have 
completed high school or higher levels.  Thus self reports are likely to somewhat overstate the 
relative extent to which those with less schooling are likely to satisfy the 20 year minimum 
contribution requirement.  Spells of reported noncontributions, finally, are strongly associated 
with nonemployment – which suggests that to increase coverage, efforts might best be directed 
towards reducing these nonemployment spells.    
2. What have people accumulated in the Chilean retirement system, and what benefits may be 
anticipated?  Earlier analysis of the 2002 EPS show that reported contributions must cover fairly 
high percentages of the work life to have replacement rates of over half (e.g., 80% of 65 year old 
man’s work life in order to have a replacement rate of 60%). With drops in the percentage of the 
work life in which contributions are made, the replacement rate falls on average by as many or 
more percentage points.  Our findings in this paper show that the EPS respondents who claim to 
know their AFP accumulations report balances that are close to those in the administrative 
records.  But those who do not claim to know their AFP balances according to the administrative 
records have much lower balances on average than those who claim to know.  Our findings also 
indicate that for respondents entitled to Recognition Bonds from when they transitioned into the 
new system, such bonds are worth on average about as much as their AFP assets.  Therefore it is 
important that assessments of their probable financial position upon retirement include the 
Recognition Bonds in addition to their AFP balances. 
3. How financially knowledgeable are Chileans about their retirement system? 
While about two thirds of AFP member respondents affirm that they receive periodic 
reports on past contributions and projected future benefits, much smaller proportions know 
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critical details such as payroll tax rates and commission rates.  That such a small percentage of 
AFP contributors know the latter suggests that work is needed to increase the effective 
competition among AFP providers.  The majority of AFP plan participants also do not know 
their AFP balances or details on the multifund system.or the details of the eligibility 
requirements for minimum pensions.  On the other hand, among those who claimed to know 
their AFP balances, they appear better informed about their accumulations than their US 
counterparts in corporate pensions, and the fraction of respondents who claimed to know their 
AFP balances increased between 2002 and 2004.  We also know that knowledge about 
retirement benefits is far from perfect. Most of the retirees according to administrative records 
also report they are self-retired. Only two-thirds of the pensioners know what kind benefit they 
receive, and 64% know the amount of the benefit (+-20%). In other words, it appears that 
information gaps are considerable, which must limit the effectiveness of the system.   
Ultimately, to build a more resilient pension system, it is likely that people will need a 
better appreciation of exactly what is required for eligibility to each of the pillars. Also, greater 
financial literacy will be essential in enhancing the contribution and investment patterns. 
Moreover, much greater knowledge of commissions and related matters is essential for making 
the AFP system more competitive.  Further, in order for the government to make useful 
budgetary projections better data are needed on who is in the system, who is contributing and 
who is likely to try to obtain MPG and/or PASIS. 
If the system is to survive to its Golden Anniversary or longer, it will also have to be 
politically resilient. This will be difficult if relatively few Chileans obtain AFP benefits or if 
replacement ratios prove low.  There probably will be pressure to raise MPGs and PASIS 
pensions, with negative fiscal implications. If people do not accumulate much, there probably 
will be pressure to allow phased withdrawals instead of annutizing the payoffs, which also poses 
risks for the government.  
It is essential, of course, in this stock-taking at the Silver Anniversary of the new Chilean 
pension system to recognize that the system is still very young, and in transition. Most people 
retiring now were actually not covered by the new system over their entire worklives; rather, 
today’s retirees continue to rely heavily on Recognition Bonds, and relatively less on AFP 
accumulations. What is unknown is how well future retirees will do who spend their entire lives 
under the new system.   Our initial analysis of the Encuesta de Proteccion Social suggests both 
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the value of further analysis and some concerns noted above that should be addressed to help the 
system to become more effective and efficient. 
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Table 1: Pension System Contribution Patterns: 1975-80 
(percentages)
Year
AFP INP Total AFP INP Total
1975 NA 71.2% 71.2% NA 61.9% 61.9%
1980 NA 53.3% 53.3% NA 47.8% 47.8%
1985 44.0% 12.8% 56.9% 38.8% 11.3% 50.1%
1990 50.6% 8.1% 58.7% 46.8% 7.5% 54.4%
1995 57.2% 5.5% 62.7% 53.5% 5.1% 58.6%
2000 59.4% 4.2% 63.6% 54.5% 3.9% 58.4%
Source: Derived from Arenas de Mesa, Berhman, and Bravo (2004)
NA: Not applicable
Contributors/Employment Contributors/Labor Force
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pre-1980 Old-Age System Revenues and Expenditures: 1974-1980
Revenues Expenditures Deficit Revenues Expenditures Deficit
1974 344,523 698,866 -354,342 3 6.2 -3.1
1975 310,985 422,261 -111,276 3.4 4.6 -1.2
1976 360,509 662,877 -302,369 3.4 6.2 -2.8
1977 454,651 831,933 -377,282 3.6 6.7 -3
1978 556,642 1,027,681 -471,039 3.7 6.8 -3.1
1979 937,063 1,241,874 -304,811 5.2 6.9 -1.7
1980 1,017,362 1,336,172 -318,81 5.5 7.2 -1.7
Year (millions of 2003 pesos ) (percent of GDP)
Sources : Marcel and Arenas de Mesa (1992); Central Bank of Chile (BCCH).
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Year
Pension Fund 
Assets under 
Management
Returns on 
Fund 
Assets
Value % of GDP
Average 
yearly real 
return
(millions of 
current pesos)  (percent)
1981 11,695 0.9 12.8
1982 44,495 3.7 28.5
1983 99,474 6.5 21.3
1984 159,576 8.4 3.6
1985 281,807 10.3 13.4
1986 433,377 12.7 12.3
1987 644,728 14.1 5.4
1988 885,875 14.7 6.5
1989 1,329,268 17.5 6.9
1990 2,244,481 23.3 15.6
1991 3,769,243 29.7 29.7
1992 4,736,462 29.4 3
1993 6,830,788 35.4 16.2
1994 8,983,563 38.8 18.2
1995 10,230,990 36.1 -2.5
1996 11,555,632 37 3.5
1997 13,405,826 38..6 4.7
1998 14,552,547 39.8 -1.1
1999 18,093,003 48.7 16.3
2000 20,343,371 50.1 4.4
2001 22,955,974 52.8 6.7
2002 25,227,058 54.4 3
2003 29,176,611 58.6 10.5
1981–1991 14.2
1991–2003 8.7
1981–2003 10.4
Source: Arenas (2005)
Table 3: Cumulative Value and Rates of Return on Chilean
Pension Fund Assets: 1981-2003
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Table 4: Distribution of Investment Portfolio: 1981–2003
(percentages of total investments)
Year Govern-ment
Financial 
Institutions a
Nonfinancial 
institutions b Equities c
Mutual 
funds and 
others d
Foreign 
Assets e Other f 
1981 28.1 71.3 0.6 0 0 0 0
1985 42.4 56 1.1 0 0 0 0.5
1990 44.1 33.4 11.1 11.3 0 0 0.1
1995 39.4 22.4 5.2 30.1 2.6 0.2 0.1
2000 35.7 35.1 4 11.6 2.5 10.8 0.2
2003 24.7 26.3 7.7 14.5 2.9 23.8 0.1
Source : Derived from Arenas (2005)
 
d. Investment funds of the business firms plus others from the external sector.
e. Foreign issuers less others from the external sector.
f. Disposable assets.
Note: Totals should sum to 100 percent except for rounding error. 
a. Financial sector less the equities of financial institutions. 
b. Business firms less equities and quotas o f investment funds.
c. Stocks of financial institutions plus those of the business sector.
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Table 5: Contribution Patterns to the Chilean Retirement System by Sex, Age, and
 Education: Number of Months Contributed by EPS 2002 Respondents
A. Respondents with Linked Records: Months of AFP Contributions Only
Mean Mean Ratio 
 Self-Report Admin  Self/Admin N
Total 113 90 126% 12108
By Sex
Men 129 103 125% 6722
Women 94 73 127% 5386
By Age     
18-20 12 13 97% 208
21-25 32 27 117% 1252
26-30 64 51 123% 2013
31-38 107 84 128% 3190
39-45 150 114 131% 2571
45-50 161 129 125% 1257
51-55 170 141 121% 964
56-60 169 141 120% 653
By Education  
< Elem 114 82 139% 2064
< HS 112 83 135% 3267
 HS 110 88 126% 3725
>HS 117 103 113% 3052
B. All Respondents: Months of Contributions to All Retirement Systems
Mean  Mean
Self-Report* N Self-Report** N
Total 121 12128 120 13397
By Sex
Men 137 6728 136 7330
Women 101 5400 100 6067
By Age
18-20 12 213 11 245
21-25 33 1255 33 1319
26-30 66 2016 65 2057
31-38 112 3193 111 3271
39-45 161 2575 156 2781
45-50 176 1259 169 1459
51-55 185 964 174 1251
56-60 184 653 166 1014
By Education
< Elem 126 2065 122 2629
< HS 120 3276 118 3625
 HS 117 3733 117 3938
>HS 122 3054 122 3205
Source: Authors' computations from the EPS 2002 and administrative records linked with EPS respondents.
Notes: EPS respondents in 2002 age 18-60; all results weighted.
*Respondents with a linked administrative record; ** All EPS 02 respondents
Number of months of contributions counted from the date of the first self-reported contribution to AFP system.
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Table 6: Pattern of Contribution Months to All Retirement Systems
 by Sex, Age, and Education: Labor Market Status at Time of Contribution
Mos While Mos While Mos While 
 Working Unemployed NILF N
By Sex Working Unempl. NILF Wage Wkr
Men 135 0.5 0.7 7330 78.72% 5.44% 3.67% 89.30%
Women 97 0.6 2.2 6067 81.86% 4.00% 2.92% 90.56%
By Age     
18-20 10 0.1 0.3 245 80.92% 1.95% 3.86% 81.69%
21-25 32 0.2 0.4 1319 82.26% 2.79% 1.91% 86.31%
26-30 65 0.2 0.6 2057 80.89% 2.48% 1.47% 86.87%
31-38 110 0.4 1.2 3271 77.89% 3.28% 2.40% 87.63%
39-45 154 0.6 1.4 2781 79.32% 4.68% 3.24% 89.93%
45-50 166 1.0 2.1 1459 79.87% 11.04% 5.98% 91.65%
51-55 171 1.2 1.6 1251 82.03% 7.56% 4.55% 93.30%
56-60 161 0.8 4.1 1014 82.73% 4.70% 7.39% 93.54%
By Education     
< Elem 119 1.0 1.8 2629 71.34% 5.49% 2.41% 85.29%
< HS 116 0.6 1.4 3625 76.07% 4.59% 3.59% 88.22%
 HS 116 0.4 1.2 3938 84.09% 4.30% 3.31% 91.29%
>HS 121 0.3 1.4 3205 85.96% 4.27% 2.92% 92.26%
Source: Authors' computations from the EPS 2002 and administrative linked data.
Notes: EPS respondents in 2002 age 18-60; all results weighted.
NILF = not in labor force.
Number of months of contributions counted from the date of the first self-reported contribution to AFP system.
% of Months Contributing of Months in 
that LF Status
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Table 7: Retirement Balances Accumlated Under the AFP and Recognition Bonds: 
Self-Report vs Administrative Records
A. Individual Account Balances, AFP System: Self Report vs Admininstrative Records 
(04 Chilean Pesos)
Doesn't Know Total
(N=4,677) (N=7,686) (N=12,363)
Percentile Self-Report Amt Admin. Amt Diff Percentage Admin. Amt Admin. Amt
p25 820,000 906,000 -86,000 -10 126,400 324,100
p50 3,000,000 2,929,800 70,200 2 742,600 1,529,000
p75 8,000,000 7,087,800 912,200 11 2,567,400 4,575,100
B. Individual Account Balances Plus Recognition Bonds: Administrative Records Only
(04 Chilean Pesos; N=2,458)
Percentile AFP Balance Bond Total
p25 86,800 748,857 5,800,972
p50 4,263,400 4,491,373 12,700,000
p75 10,700,000 13,000,000 23,800,000
C. Individual Account Balances For Those with No Recognition Bonds: Administrative Records Only
(04 Chilean Pesos; N=9,905)
Percentile AFP Balance  
p25 341,700
p50 1,293,000
p75 3,561,700
Source: Authors' computations from the EPS 2002 and administrative linked data.
Notes: EPS respondents in 2002 age 18-60; all results weighted.
For Those with a Self-Reported AFP Balance
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Table 8: Knowledge of Chilean Pension System Attributes 
Variable
% n % n % n % n % n % n
A. Receipt of AFP statement
1.1 Receives AFP statement 60.7 12367 60.6 5942
1.2 Received AFP statement past 12 mos 69.2 10131 68.8 9324 74.3 807
B. Knowledge Regarding Contributions
1. Claims knows AFP amt contrib 52.2 13397 51.5 10659 38.0 13711 46.2 10009 39.9 828 8.8 2874
2. Gave correct amt AFP contrib 28.0 13397 27.0 10659 30.9 13711 34.3 10009 34.9 828 17.8 2874
C. Knowledge Regarding Prices (Commissions)
1. Claims knows Fixed AFP commiss 1.5 12367 1.5 9805 1.7 10131 1.7 9324 1.5 807
2. Claims knows Var AFP commiss 2.7 12367 2.5 9805 2.1 10131 2.1 9324 1.7 807
3. Claims knows both commissions 0.6 12367 0.5 9805 0.5 10131 0.5 9324 0.5 807
D. Knowledge Regarding Accumulations
1. Claims knows AFP accum 44.9 12367 45.5 9805 52.7 10131 53.7 9324 42.1 807
2. Gave correct amt AFP accum (+-20%) 21.6 10124
E. Knowledge Regarding Investments
1. Knows how pension funds are invested (o 10.3 12367 9.9 9805
2.1. Knows about multifunds 47.4 10131 47.5 9324 46.8 807
2.2. Knows how many are the multifunds 32.8 10131 33.1 9324 30.3 807
2.3. Knows correctly number of multifunds 20.2 10131 20.2 9324 20.4 807
2.4. Knows his/her type of fund 32.8 10131 33.1 9324 28.9 807
2.5. Knows correctly his/her type of fund 15.8 10131 16.1 9324 13.0 807
2.6. Knows the riskier fund 38.1 10131 38.8 9324 30.0 807
2002 Survey 2004 Survey
All respondents 2002 Affiliates All respondents 2002 Affiliates 2004 New Affiliates 2004 Non-Affiliates
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Table 8 (cont) 
  
Variable
% n % n % n % n % n % n
F.1. AFP System
1.1. Knows Female legal retirement age 83.2 13397 82.8 10659 76.5 13711 79.0 10009 73.3 828 68.5 2874
1.2. Knows Male legal retirement age 86.1 13397 85.9 10659 80.0 13711 82.7 10009 77.0 828 71.4 2874
1.3. Knows how AFP calculates pensions 14.2 12367 13.8 9805 9.3 13711 11.1 10009 8.3 828 3.5 2874
1.4a. Claims spouse gets survivor pension 
benefit 66.4 13397 66.7 10659 65.2 9755 64.1 7319 61.0 384 69.8 2052
1.4b. Claims spouse gets survivor pension 
benefit */ 69.3 9931 69.6 7910 66.1 9037 64.9 6818 62.6 287 71.1 1932
1.5a. Claims kids get survivor pension 
benefit 61.4 13397 60.9 10659 32.8 11061 40.7 8272 30.5 444 5.3 2344
1.5b. Claims kids get survivor pension 
benefit */ 61.4 13397 60.9 10659 33.3 10599 41.3 7944 33.0 387 5.1 2268
F.2. Guaranteed Benefits
2.1. Claims knows reqs for min pen 22.2 13397 22.5 10659 31.1 13711 34.3 10009 19.8 828 23.2 2874
2.2. Knows reqs for min pen 0.2 13397 0.2 10659 0.2 13711 0.2 10009 0.1 828 0.2 2874
2.3a Knows there's minimum pension 44.9 13711 49.0 10009 38.1 828 32.9 2874
2.3b Claims knows min pension amt 20.3 13397 21.0 10659 32.8 13711 36.0 10009 25.9 828 23.9 2874
2.4. Gave correct value min pension amt 4.9 13397 5.1 10659 3.4 13711 3.7 10009 2.5 828 2.6 2874
F.3. Welfare Benefits
3.1. Claims knows reqs for welfare pension
19.3 13397 20.3 10659 19.6 13711 20.5 10009 12.3 828 18.4 2874
3.2. Gave correct reqs for welfare pension 2.7 13397 2.7 10659 3.8 13711 4.0 10009 1.4 828 3.9 2874
3.3. Claims knows welfare pension amt 17.0 13397 18.0 10659 17.5 13667 17.8 9972 10.4 828 18.6 2868
3.4. Gave correct amt welfare pension 11.2 13397 11.9 10659 11.9 13667 11.5 9972 6.9 828 14.6 2868
Notes:
1. Affiliation Status comes from administrative data
2. Sample is restricted to population 18-60 (ages in year 2002)
*/ 2002 and 2004 surveys have different questions making VI.1.4 and VI.1.5 not comparable.
*/ VI.1.4b and VI.1.5b apply to more comparable subsets of people among 2002 and 2004 surveys
n=refers to number of people who were asked the question
2004 Survey
All respondents 2002 Affiliates All respondents 2002 Affiliates 2004 New Affiliates 2004 Non-Affiliates
Source: Authors’ calculations from respondents to SPS 2002 and 2004 surveys. 
2002 Survey
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Table 9: Pensions Under the AFP System 
Self-Report vs Administrative Records
A. Pensions, AFP System: Self Report vs Administrative Records*
(04 Chilean Pesos)
Percentile
Self-Report 
Amt Admin. Amt Diff Percentage
p25 65,000 60,667 4,333 6.7
p50 69,420 74,175 -4,755 -6.8
p75 70,000 74,883 -4,883 -7.0
Percentile
Self-Report 
Amt Admin. Amt Diff Percentage
p25 70,000 73,454 -3,454 -4.9
p50 85,000 93,041 -8,041 -9.5
p75 130,000 142,361 -12,361 -9.5
For Those with a Self-Reports and Administrative records in AFP
Phased Withdrawal
Life Annuity
(N=604)
For Those with Self-Reports and Administrative records in AFP
(N=148)
(Median of the percentile)
(Median of the percentile)
 
B. Pensions in the AFP System: Knowledge  **
% N
B.1. Know that have a retirement pension 84.4 1,092
     Life Annuity 92.8 702
     Phased Withdrawal 72.6 440
     Temporary Income 95.5 64
    Median pension of those that know
    Median pension of those that don't know
B.2. Claim Knows his/her type of pension 82.0 911
     Life Annuity 89.4 648
     Phased Withdrawal 68.1 308
     Temporary Income 92.4 60
    Median pension of those claim know
    Median pension of those claim don't know
B.3. Know correctly his/her type of pension 66.0 911
     Life Annuity 74.9 648
     Phased Withdrawal 52.1 308
     Temporary Income 73.2 60
    Median pension of those correctly know
    Median pension of those claim don't know correctly
B.4. Know his/her amount of pension (+-20%) 63.9 676
     Life Annuity 68.2 539
     Phased Withdrawal 57.0 179
    Median pension of those that know his/her amount of pension
    Median pension of those that don't know his/her amount of pension
For Those with Self-Reports and Administrative records in AFP
78,602
110,998
91,760
121,013
129,430
81,126
92,256
91,085
 
Source: Authors' computations from the EPS 2002 and administrative linked data.
* Old Age Pension, Phased Withdrawal and Annuities
** Panel 2002-04, Old Age Pension include Phased Withdrawal and Life Annuity  
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C. Number of benefits in the AFP System : Official Figures
Phased Life Temporary Phased Life Temporary Phased Life Temporary 
1990 16,893 12,689 84 4,095 2,645 45 15,176 4,857 19
2000 76,710 142,446 6,217 12,045 7,840 396 55,229 38,402 19
2005 115,236 256,107 5,786 22,496 14,475 1090 71,057 62,507 40
Source: SAFP
Old Age Disability Survival
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Figure 1: Contribution Patterns to the Chilean AFP System by Age: 
Self-Reported vs Administrative Records
A. Months of Contributions to the AFP System
l
B. Months of Contributions to All Retirement Systems
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' computations; EPS '02 respondents age 18-60 with linked administrative record;
All results weighted; N=11,305.
Notes: Number of months of contributions counted from the date of the first contribution to any AFP
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Figure 2: Projected Accumulations in AFP Accounts at Retirement Age
Given Alternative Density of Contribution Assumptions
Source: Arenas de Mesa, Behrman, Bravo (2004)
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Figure 3: Projected Replacement Rates
Under Alternative Density of Contribution Assumptions
Source: Arenas de Mesa, Behrman, Bravo (2004)
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